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ABSTRACTS 
 
It has been frequently argued that under globalisation, the state's ability to make 
autonomous decisions declines and the state withers away as it adapts to the 
lowest common denominator of taxation and social services in order to attract 
global investment flows. This paper challenges the withering-state theory. States 
are not hapless victims of globalisation, but active facilitators. Through the case 
studies of Vietnam and Malaysia, it is demonstrated that the state makes decisions 
about globalisation—either to engage in it or to retreat from it—based on the 
state's perceived interest. Moreover, the state is perfectly capable of reversing 
these decisions as state interests change over time.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Critics of globalisation have made a strong argument about the future of the 
state: in an era where every day billions of dollars worth of footloose capital 
without any national allegiance slosh around the world for the best return, 
the state withers away, losing its sovereignty to investors, credit rating 
agencies and international financiers. Corporations have all the power, and 
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states—especially small and poor ones—must play by the investors' rules or 
see precious capital go elsewhere. A race to the bottom ensues, where taxes, 
regulations and social wages converge to the lowest common denominator. 
Only developed countries with large domestic economies can use market 
power to attract investors without reducing environmental regulations, 
labour standards, minimum wage and social charges. Smaller nations with 
less financial attraction for investors, such as Malaysia or Vietnam, find 
their ability to act in the best interest of their citizens reduced to a bare 
minimum. 
 This is a powerful claim, echoing the position of dependency theory 
of earlier days. Dependistas argued that engagement with the global 
economy holds only pain for the peripheral economies, since all power 
resides with global finance in the core countries. The intellectual heirs of 
dependency theory among globalisation critics now argue that power lies 
with the global elites—colluding beneficiaries of globally mobile money—
while the masses are either duped into cooperation through hegemonic 
discourses, or forced into compliance by force. The state can no longer 
protect its citizens and either plays second fiddle to the captains of banking 
and industry, or actively participates in the exploitation of the masses. 
 There are undoubtedly a number of examples where the state is 
declining. This paper, however, taking its cues from what appear to be 
strong, yet successfully integrated states, challenges the withering state 
hypothesis. It takes a close look at two strong states that have integrated into 
the global economy, Malaysia and Vietnam. The cases are chosen on 
account of their claims of different experiences with globalisation. In 
Vietnam, clear majorities of both the leadership and the population at large 
are highly supportive of economic globalisation, that is, foreign investment 
and international trade integration. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir 
has changed his tune. Until the 1997 Asian financial crisis, he was an active 
globaliser, arguing that integration would bring Malaysians out of poverty 
and into the modern world. Since the collapse, he has emerged as one of the 
most vocal critics of the phenomenon of globalisation.  
 Both countries have, however, a clearly active state. The paper will 
show that in both cases, the state maintained agency throughout its 
engagement with the global economy. In the case of Vietnam, it has so far 
managed this engagement successfully. In the case of Malaysia, early 
success led to domestic policy mistakes and economic problems, yet the 
state remained in the driver's seat and in the aftermath of the crisis provided 
powerful evidence that where the state sees limits to global market forces in 
its interest, it remains free to impose them. 
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GLOBALISATION AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
 
Developing countries have a high number of underemployed workers and 
little capital. The developed world has the capital, but faces cost structures 
that are unprofitable for labour-intensive manufacturing and assembly. 
Thus, money roams around the world in search of the best deal—low wages, 
weak regulatory regimes and pliant governments. With many countries in 
need of the money, the bargaining power rests with the capitalist, and 
countries either comply with the demands of investors or lose out to a 
competitor who will. Wages and regulation levels converge at the lowest 
possible denominator. This so-called convergence theory represents a 
structuralist view, one in which economic globalisation imposes its logic 
and states simply have no alternative.1 One author sums it up when he says: 
"The humane and compassionate state is being phased out" (Falk 1997: 
130). In this Darwinian race, the state either offers what global finance 
wants or bears the bitter consequences of poverty. Mittelman (2000: 5) 
summarizes this view well: 
 
[Economic globalisation] offers major benefits, including gains in 
productivity, technological advances, higher standards of living, more jobs, 
broader access to consumer products at lower cost, widespread dissemination 
of information and knowledge, reductions in poverty in some parts of the 
world, and a release from long-standing social hierarchies in many countries. 
Yet there is a price for integrating in this global framework and adopting its 
practices. Expressed or tacit acceptance of being encompassed in 
globalisation entails a lessening, or in some case a negating, of the quantum 
of political control exercised by the encompassed, especially in the least 
powerful and poorest zones of the global economy.  
 
The cause for this seemingly Darwinian race is "hypercompetition" 
(Mittelman 2000: 4). Many scholars, activists and even political leaders, 
especially those critical of the phenomenon of globalisation, believe that the 
pressures from extremely mobile capital and the sheer size of capital flows 
that can be initiated by pressing a button on a computer in New York or 
London overwhelm the state's power to counteract theses forces. As a result, 
states will engage in "regulatory arbitrage," investing in or importing from 
the country with the lowest costs. Thus, developing countries dependent on 
investment and exports for hard currency are forced to align their tax 
                                                 
1 This formulation borrows from the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who 
referred to globalisation as TINA: "There Is No Alternative."  
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structure and regulations downwards to a lowest common denominator to 
avoid being left out (Drezner 2001: 57–8). 
 Mittelman, taking a Gramscian approach, asks who the hegemon2 is 
in globalisation. Since no central authority can claim control over the global 
financial or trading system, the structure of globalisation should be non-
hierarchical. If there are, however, hegemons who impose their order on the 
structure, as most globalisation scholars believe, then who are these 
champions of globalisation (Mittelman 2000: 920–21)? In the context of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia's then-Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad was in the forefront of criticising globalisation, accusing global 
financiers of willfully destroying Malaysia's economy. For him, as for many 
critics of globalisation, the hegemon is 'the West,' its investors and 
speculators, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Treasury 
Department, even large investors who impose the rules of the game on small 
countries in need of capital and factories that hire the workers who want to 
escape the poverty of rural subsistence life (Mahathir 1999; Makaruddin 
2002). The structure of globalisation, for Mahathir, is one of domination. 
History has come full circle, with globalisation bringing poor countries back 
to the era of colonialism, with the West dominating the rest, just under a 
different umbrella. Dominant states, in this view, remain active agents 
shaping the process of globalisation; only the weak ones are subjected to the 
convergence imposed on them by forces created by the hegemon. 
 But Mahathir's record on globalisation also allows for an alternative 
view of the state in globalisation, namely one of the state as active 
facilitator. In the case of Mahathir's Malaysia, globalisation allowed 
Malaysia to partake of the benefits of increasing wealth and new 
technologies. This was Mahathir's position prior to the financial crisis, when 
he actively pushed Malaysia—and particularly ethnic Malays—to leave the 
countryside and join a modern economy. To bring about these changes, 
Malaysia's government actively vied for foreign investment, promoted 
manufacturing for export and worked hard to allow its industries to climb up 
the value chain. Only after the 1997 crisis shook Mahathir's government did 
the emphasis turn toward the alleged price of this modernising policy— 
renewed submission to the world's dominant powers. Which Mahathir is 
right? The one who claims that far-away high finance can destroy an 
economy with sound fundamentals at the click of a button on a computer 
                                                 
2 While the term hegemony generally describes a situation of dominance or superiority, Antonio 
Gramsci defines it as the power to dominate others while leading the oppressed to believe that 
their submission is in their own best interest. The oppressed thus participate in their 
oppression. 
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keyboard by withdrawing billions of dollars and sending them somewhere 
else across the globe where the government has consented to cutting taxes 
and regulations even further? Or the one who argues that states have the 
ability to shape globalisation to their benefit, imposing rules on the global 
economy and implementing capital controls, as Mahathir himself has done 
in 1998? While Mahathir's writings are full of contradictions and attempts at 
minimising the role of his government in bringing about the conditions for 
the 1997 economic crisis, scholars have made coherent arguments about 
whether globalisation rings in the end of the state. 
The argument here put forth is that the state has not been changed as 
much as globalisation critics perceive. The state is still dominated by elite 
groups that shape policy in their interest. As a result, globalisation is 
harnessed by these elites for their benefit. To evaluate the impact of 
globalisation on the state, one must look at elite interest, not an abstract 
structure that pushes countries around like billiard balls, leaving them 
without agency of their own. A state's response to the demands of global 
finance depends on the interests of the state's elites, not an inevitable logic 
of the structure of globalisation. If globalisation is inevitable, it is because 
elites the world over share similar interests, and push in the same directions. 
The two examples in this paper, Malaysia and Vietnam, two developing 
nations that have done comparatively well under conditions of trade opening 
and global integration, have retained a significant degree of policy 
autonomy to act in the interest of the dominant elite actors. If they have 
accepted a reduction in their autonomy at times, it is because the elites 
found it in their interest to do so.  
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 
 
Before we can discuss the impact of globalisation on the state, we must 
define these amorphous concepts. Globalisation has been defined in a 
variety of ways, including a shrinking of the time-space continuum, and 
through various cultural aspects, but for the purpose of this discussion, we 
shall only look at its economic expressions. Globalisation in our context is 
synonymous with trade opening, free markets and competition for 
international investment flows. Both Malaysia and Vietnam have opened 
their domestic markets to foreign investors, have focused on export 
production and made concessions to foreign producers and adopted 
international trade and investment regimes in return. Nothing about this 
process challenges national sovereignty. Nothing can prevent governments 
from setting their own standards, rules and regulations. Even in economic 
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relations with investors and international markets, the domestic government 
remains the primary contracting party, rather than a United Nations (UN) 
agency, the World Bank, a transnational corporation or a non-profit 
organisation (Spruyt 2002: 145). This paper concerns itself with the 
question whether, to what degree and why the state may have lost autonomy 
in the domestic sphere. 
 Defining the state is more complicated. First, for this discussion, we 
do not see 'the state' as a physical entity, such as a territory within 
recognised boundaries, nor is it  synonymous with 'the government' or 
'national institutions.' These are manifestations of what we consider 'the 
state.' Instead, we define 'the state' as the outcome of the continuous process 
of capturing and recapturing the benefits of control over these 
manifestations by various interest groups. This is the liberal view of the 
state, and one that suits us well for a discussion on how the state changes 
under conditions of globalisation. Vietnam and Malaysia are excellent case 
studies because the dominant interest groups in each—the  United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) in the case of Malaysia and the Communist 
Party in Vietnam—have been exceptionally stable over time. It is thus easier 
to see what impact an exogenous force like globalisation has had, than it 
would be in countries where domestic contestation among interest groups 
has been more vigorous and led to frequent realignments or constant 
struggle.   
 The state, under the above definition, acts on society by imposing 
norms that are beneficial to the dominant interest group or groups. These 
norms change in detail depending on which groups are in control, but in 
principle they remain fairly stable: the state lays out and enforces the rules 
of the game with emphasis on continuity, stability and predictability to 
avoid rapid social changes. To do so, the state needs to be the monopolist 
over the means of violence, for a system with one single entity providing 
enforcement is more efficient than competing enforcers (Tilly 1985). This 
view represents, of course, an extension of Max Weber's state as being a 
claimant of a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. But, as Mygdal 
adds, a monopoly over the use of violence is not enough, since few states 
enforce their rule by violence alone. States and their citizens are in a 
constant, mutually transformative relationship (Mygdal 1997). The 
dominant elites aim at legitimacy, since enforcement though acceptance is 
easier than through force alone. 
 In this sense, states that are part of the globalising economy behave 
exactly like states before the liberalisation of trade flows and global 
investment regimes. The only difference under globalisation is how states 
go about obtaining their objective—maintaining their subjects' obedience 
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(Mygdal 1997: 223). In other words, what has changed in the global 
economy is the rationale for a state's legitimacy; what allows the state, the 
dominant groups that have captured it, to demand obedience from the rest of 
society? While legitimacy of rule used to be based on tradition (inheritance, 
divine right) and success in war (Spruyt 2002: 144) or consent of the 
governed (democracy), many states today tout their role in providing strong 
economic growth, high levels of employment and rising living standards 
when claiming their (continued) right to rule.3 The Chinese concept of the 
Mandate from Heaven reflects this historical claim to legitimacy. As long as 
no invaders breach the defenses and no natural catastrophes befall society, 
the ruler retains legitimacy. But a serious reversal of fortunes would indicate 
that the ruler has lost the support of the heavens and revolt becomes 
legitimate. This is an example of state legitimacy based on successful 
governance in the common interest. Such a concept of legitimacy by success 
indeed limits the autonomy of the state. Rulers must accept the discipline of 
the market if their claim to continued rule depends on the economy's 
performance within the global market. Depending on one's views of the 
state, benign or predatory, such a limitation will either render politicians 
incapable of protecting their subjects from the vagaries of capitalism, or 
render them incapable of fleecing their subjects at their will. But in either 
view, the state is curtailed by the forces of the market (Wolf 2001: 178).  
 
 
WITHER THE GLOBALIZING STATE? 
 
Limited autonomy of states is nothing new in the neo-realist literature that 
has dominated international relations theory for decades. Neo-realism has 
traditionally assumed that states behave as "like units," acting as the 
international, anarchic structure requires, in order to assure their survival 
(Waltz 1979: 74–77). This does not necessarily mean they have no agency 
at all, but that they are limited in their actions by external pressures 
exercised on them. In spite of this stripped-down version of state agency, 
the global system in neo-realism remained state-centric. Reduced domestic 
autonomy for the state has not led to realist claims that the state withers in 
the international arena. Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Cuba have intentionally 
shut out most of the effects of globalisation, yet they remain crucial actors 
in international politics. Similarly, states do not lose their power of agency 
                                                 
3 This is true both for democracies, where economic performance is routinely a key electoral 
argument, and for authoritarian regimes that argue that economic stability and progress grant 
the ruling elite the right to continue their domination over society for the public good. 
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in the global economy. Vietnam and Malaysia, the two states discussed in 
greater detail below, have joined globalisation, but at their own pace. 
Malaysia has gone a step further and  actively retreated from globalisation 
during the Asian financial crisis as the state saw fit. The world's largest 
corporations continue to apply to the state for licenses.4 Tax rates are still 
set by states, not lenders or investors,5 and they differ from state to state. 
Fiscal policy is driven by the state, and most states regulate banks, currency 
markets and other crucial financial institutions, rather than abdicating them 
to the vagaries of the market. The sovereignty of the state thus remains 
intact. At question is domestic state autonomy. To what degree are states 
hamstrung by the forces of globalisation once they have made the choice 
that they want to participate in international trade and investment regimes? 
As already indicated, the initial choice of acceptance or refusal to be inside 
the structure of globalisation is undoubtedly still the state's to make, and 
continues to be, unless and until the international system of anarchy is 
undone. The issue is to what degree the decision to join the global economy, 
once it is made, restricts the state in its ability to shape what can be called 
the "terms of engagement" with globalisation (Othman & Kessler 2000: 
1015).  
 The question, thus, is not whether the state is in retreat, but to what 
degree it finds itself in a straightjacket once it has taken the decision to 
participate in the global economy (Weiss 2005: 345–46). But why would 
states make choices that limit their domestic policy autonomy? Policy 
choices are made for rationally functional reasons, and no agents would 
make a decision to join the global economy just to see their fortunes wane. 
If states forfeit autonomy in the process, they must expect benefits that 
outweigh the limitations. Hence, the structure that limits state action is not 
mainly the international one called globalisation, but largely that of 
domestic institutional arrangements and competition among elite groups. 
The evidence for this assertion lies in the empirical observation that 
although there is too much commonality in state action for it to be random, 
there is also too much divergence to support the claim that globalisation is 
an outside force that overpowers the state and turns it into a mere puppet 
manipulated by the forces of globalisation. In short, as the cases of Malaysia 
and Vietnam will show, globalisation delineates limits to state behaviour for 
                                                 
4 In the autumn of 2008, the Vietnamese government rejected a multi-billion dollar investment 
project by Korean steel maker POSCO over environmental concerns. While the government 
may have feared protests by people working in the region's tourism industry, it is clear that the 
state retained significant autonomy over the regulation of international capital. 
5
 Vietnam is consistently rejecting a reduction in corporate taxes, in spite of less than subtle 
suggestions made by international chambers of commerce and investors. 
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states that chose to join it, yet significant residual agency remains within 
those limits. Most of all, elite interest trumps the demands of the global 
economy. The state's dominant elites determine whether they see it in their 
interest to accept the limits set by globalisation or to reject them in part or 
entirely. The differing institutional arrangements and incentive structures in 
different countries explain the differences in response to globalisation across 
countries and at various times. 
Moreover, the evidence that proponents of the withering state theory 
propose is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny. Approximately 90% 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows into developed countries, where 
labour standards, tax rates and social wages are high, not into nations 
converging toward the lowest common denominator (Drezner 2001: 67). 
Localities can still tax and regulate if they have specific advantages that are 
not easily moved, such as natural resources, human capital, large markets 
and the like. It is harder under conditions of globalisation, however, for 
jurisdictions to demand high taxes without providing something in return. 
Scandinavia shows that high taxes do not necessarily lead to mass 
emigration, as long as the services provided in return are excellent (Wolf 
2001: 186–8). Falk's assertion (Falk 1997: 130; above) that globalisation is 
phasing out the Scandinavian model does not bear out.  
 Even within the developing world, convergence is not observable. 
Drezner points out that if trade opening and competition for FDI were to 
lead to lower labour standards, then these standards should be especially lax 
in Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which are specifically set up to attract 
foreign corporations. But he finds that wages tend to be higher in such 
zones, and that strong labour union activity in EPZs leads to no reduction of 
investment by international corporations (Drezner 2001: 68). In Vietnam, 
female migrants are more likely to receive health insurance from their 
employers than their male counterparts, because female migrant workers are 
most likely to work for foreign-owned companies in EPZs, which in turn are 
significantly more likely to provide health insurance than domestic 
enterprises (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2006). Corporations do not 
simply take "random walks" whenever a slightly better deal opens up 
elsewhere. Much of European capital outflows today are portfolio 
investments, not shifting production facilities to places where regulations, 
taxes and wages are lowest (Weiss 1997: 8–10). Some states have even 
actively tried to push industries out to assure that they make use of cheaper 
labour rates elsewhere before losing international competitiveness. Japan 
tried to push companies to go offshore to stay cost competitive and to 
reduce its politically damaging trade surplus. Singapore financed industrial 
parks in developing countries, just to make Singaporean companies take the 
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plunge and go offshore. Korea and Taiwan are also helping their firms to 
establish overseas production facilities. The assumption that companies will 
always seek out the cheapest places is overly simplistic (Weiss 1997: 22–
23). 
 Not even the presumably footloose capital sloshing around the world 
is observable. It has been pointed out that the level of trade and investment 
today is comparable to earlier periods in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century (for example Wolf 2001: 179–80). Economic integration 
creates pressures, but they are moderated, adjusted or heightened by 
domestic institutional factors. Conformity can be enhanced by globalisation, 
yet states still act based on domestic interest, that is, the interest of the 
dominant elite of the moment (Weiss 2005: 345–6). If states accept a 
straightjacket, it is because their elites determine that the benefits from that 
straightjacket exceed the costs. The following discussion of East Asia and 
the particular cases of Vietnam and Malaysia will support this claim, and 
show that as states feel that the straightjacket is becoming too costly, they 
are perfectly able to shed it. 
 
 
A LOOK AT EAST ASIA 
 
East Asia has a long history with state involvement in economic 
development, and particularly with the state's shaping of the terms of 
engagement with the global economy. At the beginning of the 'East Asian 
miracle' is what is commonly known as the developmental state. This was a 
strong state with a wide degree of autonomy, but also one that actively 
sought export markets, which implies accepting the discipline of the 
international economy (White & Wade 1988; Johnson 1995; Yoo 2006). 
The three most successful developmental states, Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea, intervened not only in the allocation of resources in the domestic 
economy, but also forced their industries to produce for exports (World 
Bank 1993: 261, 358–60). By imposing the discipline of international 
markets on their key sectors, they prevented industries from using their 
growing clout for domestic political protection. The state intentionally gave 
up influence in return for better economic performance. 
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Table 1 
Level of Globalisation – 2006 Ratings (Selection). 
2006 rank (Selection) Economic 
dimension 2006 
Trade 2006 FDI 2006 
1  Singapore 1 1 1 
2  Switzerland 9 17 7 
3  United States 58 62 36 
4  Ireland 4 4 5 
5  Denmark 8 20 6 
6  Canada 23 30 12 
7  Netherlands 21 11 52 
8  Australia 18 55 3 
9  Austria 15 15 18 
10 Sweden ... 19 21 16 
19 Malaysia …  3 2 11 
29 South Korea … 32 26 41 
35 Taiwan … 12 9 32 
51 China … 28 27 21 
53 Kenya 55 42 60 
54 Colombia 51 54 33 
55 Egypt 42 35 42 
56 Pakistan 60 59 53 
57 Turkey 47 38 47 
58 Bangladesh  61 57 58 
59 Venezuela 48 44 44 
60 Indonesia 52 36 61 
61 India 59 58 49 
62 Iran 67 46 62 
 
Source: Kearney (2006) 
 
Notes: Numbers next to country name represent ranking among 62 states studied. Total ranking 
is calculated from four dimensions: economic, personal, technological and political. To evaluate 
convergence theory, the economic dimension is most relevant and listed here. The economic 
dimension is composed of the importance of trade and FDI in the overall economy.  
 
The table lists the top and bottom ranking ten countries in terms of global integration, and adds 
countries of particular interest to this discussion, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and China. 
Kearny did not rank Vietnam.  
Full report: http://www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/Globalisation-Index_FP_Nov-Dec-06_S 
.pdf 
 
Importantly, it was the state that chose the form of the country's 
international economic engagement to make use of global market forces for 
domestic goals—both by using integration and by limiting it at certain 
points. In a similar way, Vietnam and Malaysia, in their own contexts, 
shaped the terms of engagement with the global economy. These more 
recent examples fall more directly into the time period that is generally 
considered the era of globalisation. The main difference between the export-
based disciplining of the domestic economy and the recent Southeast Asian 
(and also Chinese) success stories lies in the latter's increased emphasis on 
foreign direct investment. While emphasis on exports imposes a degree of 
discipline on industries, export promotion does not require the same 
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domestic limitations on state predation as does a focus on attracting FDI. 
Importing goods does not require long-term trust in the performance of the 
exporter's economy. If a product's quality or cost changes or government 
regulations make dealing with exporting companies difficult, contracts can 
be cancelled and other suppliers found without great difficulty. Investors, by 
contrast, need to be reasonably certain that the business conditions in the 
host countries will remain conducive throughout the length of time it takes 
to recoup the sunken costs.6 These business conditions include low taxes, 
low levels of red tape, an investor-friendly regulatory environment, and 
cheap and docile labour, the key ingredients of the convergence argument. 
But even the investment-dependent countries defy convergence theory. As 
Table 1 shows, the most economically open nations are not the ones with 
the weakest state. Singapore ranks as the most globalised nation overall. It 
also tops all other 61 countries in a study in terms of trade openness and FDI 
(Kearney 2006: 77). Yet Singapore is a strong state that intervenes in many 
of the areas where convergence theorists would expect a withering of the 
state: social policy, a safety net for the poor and regulation of the economy. 
The second-highest ranked Asian country is Malaysia on nineteenth place in 
overall globalisation level, but second in trade openness and eleventh in 
FDI. All the top-ranked countries other than Singapore are developed 
Western nations, all have strong welfare states. While some rank high on the 
economic dimension of globalisation, others do not. The United States (US), 
for example, owes its high globalisation ranking to the other dimensions, 
while ranking fairly low on the economic side. No connection between trade 
openness, impact of FDI on the overall economy and economic integration 
on one hand and role of the state in society on the other hand is visible. 
Instead, interest groups harness the forces of international trade and 
investment for their purpose. This was visible in the developmental state 
and remains so today.7 The following two case studies underline this point. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Hence the relationship between stability and cost structure. In a stable country, costs can be 
higher if returns are good, since the risks are low. The higher the risk of a reversal of 
conditions, the faster the investor wants the investment back, and the higher the risk premium. 
7 As a recent example, in the 2008 US presidential campaign, Senator John McCain emphasized 
the importance of free trade, while Senator Barack Obama spoke about fair trade and the 
possibility of reversing unpopular trade agreements. Both candidates spoke to their political 
base in order to gain votes. Not the global economy, but electoral considerations dominated the 
issue of trade. 
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Vietnam—Bottom-Up and Top-Down Globalisation 
 
In January of 2007, Vietnam was admitted into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). This achievement marked the culmination of 
Vietnam's decade-long reversal of a previously centrally planned, autarkic 
economy. But unlike Eastern Europe, the economic change was not 
precipitated by a change in political leadership. The same single party 
government that dominated Vietnam in the years of protectionism and a 
state-led, domestic-oriented economy now commits the country to trade 
openness and membership in as many free trade agreements as possible. 
Since the economic reforms initiated in 1986, called doi moi (renovation), 
Vietnam has joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and the ASEAN Free Trade Area, concluded a host of bilateral trade 
agreements, including one with the erstwhile enemy, the US, and then 
pushed its way into WTO with an unshakable sense of purpose.  
 Clearly, the communist government of Vietnam did not 'globalise' for 
ideological reasons. Most of the current leadership came of age during the 
war against capitalist imperialism. They joined the rest of the world not 
because they were ideologically so predisposed or because they bought into 
the dominant Western discourse, but because they realised that due to a 
groundswell of popular demand, the elite's very own success was advanced 
by it. While globalisation opponents argue that the hegemon of globalisation 
can be found in the developed world (see Mittelman & Mahathir above), in 
Vietnam, this hegemony is internal. The majority in the Communist Party 
decided on reform because it remembers the traditions of old: the state's 
legitimacy derives from the performance of the tasks expected from it. This 
Mandate from Heaven once implied defending the people from their 
external enemies and from the wrath of nature, like drought and flood. 
Today, the first indicator of state performance is the provision of a steady 
increase in material well-being, except in situations of severe crisis, such as 
war or cataclysmic catastrophes, when the priorities shift to survival. 
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has claimed repeatedly that democracy is not an 
Asian concept; instead, government is legitimised by its performance 
(Rohwer 1995). So the Vietnamese elites espouse the discourse of the 
market and provide economic growth.  
Yet this is not the convergence theory that eats away at the power of 
the state to regulate and protect. The government has made it very clear that 
its doi moi policy is "growth with equity," not a race to the bottom. A race to 
the bottom would not advance the claims of the elite to the right of 
continued rule. The government has maintained a strong hand in the 
economy to assure a socially equitable distribution of the gains. The poverty 
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rate has indeed declined from 58% in the early 1990s to just under 20% 
today (Vietnam News Agency 2007). Clearly, both autarky and trade 
integration were decided by the state for the perceived interest of the elite 
groups that dominate the state. First, the Vietnamese elites decided on the 
centrally planned economy that failed. When they saw it in their interest to 
reform, they decided on the reversal of policy as well as on the course of 
reforms. Hence, if globalisation is inevitable, it is not because of the 
dominant discourse of corporations or what is generically called  'the West,' 
but because of the groundswell of demands from large numbers of regular 
people. The elites saw it in their interest to join the global economy, in order 
to maintain their power and to benefit economically. They could only do so 
by satisfying a bottom-up demand for economic improvement. A large 
number of Vietnam's new jobs are created in the export sector. Then-Deputy 
Prime Minister (and former Trade Minister) Vu Khoan recognised the 
importance of FDI and export processing for social stability when he wrote:  
 
FDI accounts for 14–15% of GDP and approximately 30% of industrial 
output and export volume. As a result, economic integration in general and 
WTO accession in particular has become an inherent demand of the 
Vietnamese economy (Vu Khoan 2005). 
 
Yet where the openness leads to social problems that undercut the 
stated goals of the government, elites determine whether the state should 
step in or let the market forces run their course. An example for Vietnam's 
ability to control the forces of globalisation when the state sees it in its 
interest is in labour rights. Vietnam has a higher minimum wage rate for 
foreign than for domestic companies. In 2006 and 2007, an increasing 
number of wild-cat strikes hit industrial zones around Ho Chi Minh City. 
Strikes are illegal in Vietnam. The strikes hit primarily Taiwanese and 
South Korean firms, said to offer comparatively bad working conditions 
among foreign-owned factories. The government not only did not crush the 
strikes, but increased the minimum wage by 40%, very much to the anger of 
the companies involved (Economist 2006; Vietnam News Agency 2006; 
China Post 2007). In 2007, foreign-owned firms paid a minimum wage of 
about $50 a month, a rate which has increased further in 2008. Foreign 
investors, especially in the low-end manufacturing sectors, have already 
begun to complain, arguing that they had come to Vietnam because of low 
wages and the virtual absence of labour action. Investors were quoted in 
international business magazines, putting the government on warning.  The 
Economist, for example, quoted a an official from Taiwan's representative 
office (the unofficial embassy) as saying that while "Chinese wages are 
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higher [...] the quality and efficiency are also higher." He then urged the 
Vietnamese government to keep Vietnam investor-friendly (Economist 
2006). The government, however, remained unimpressed and implemented 
the wage increases. More strikes occurred when companies were slow to 
apply the new rates. Again, the government did not act according to the 
race-to-the-bottom predictions, but supported the workers over the foreign 
investors. Foreign investment is not seen as a good in itself, but as a means 
to an end—socio-economic improvement.  
Vietnam reflects well what Weiss calls the dualism between the logic 
of capital versus the logic of voice (Weiss 2005: 347). The logic of capital 
assumes that capital leaves if conditions are not favourable. The logic of 
voice assumes that a widespread demand in society has an impact on elites 
and will supersede the logic of capital and impose limits on it. While the 
Vietnamese elites have always acted in their perceived best interest—by 
eschewing globalisation first, and by espousing it later—the logic of voice 
has played a major role in providing incentives for and limiting the possible 
range of policies. Their collective voice, in the end, is what allows regular 
people to enter into the elites' calculation of the elite self-interest.  
 
Malaysia—State-Managed Globalisation 
 
Malaysia's form of government is one of consociational democracy. 
Democracy, however, is an amorphous concept. It is not just a question 
whether there are regular, free elections. More to the point is the question to 
what degree a regime is obligated for its own survival to respond to its 
citizens' demands (Dahl 1971: 1–2). Democracies respond to pressures from 
below, for governments depend for their survival on the continuous support 
from the populace. Malaysia is one of the many regime types that are 
categorised in the 'ambiguous' or 'mixed' type. Its institutional framework is 
essentially democratic, with regular, free elections, a parliament and an 
independent judiciary. But there is a wide range of authoritarian controls 
that limit the possibilities of the opposition. In short, the ruling coalition is 
extremely unlikely to be defeated at the polls (Crouch 1996: 4–6), reducing 
the political voice of those outside UMNO's coalition of supporters. The 
consociational nature of the system adds to UMNO's strength. Elites are not 
limited by public opinion overall, but mostly by the win-coalition whose 
support UMNO needs to assure in order to maintain its dominant position 
within the multi-ethnic country.  
 
 
 
69  
IJAPS, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 2009)                                   Thomas Jandl 
Merdeka—independence in 1957—is based on a bargain in which the 
Malay majority of just over 50% of the population assumed political control 
in return for granting the Chinese minority (approximately 25%)8 
citizenship rights. As UMNO lost its two-thirds majority in 1969, unrest 
broke out and the government decided to calm the population by initiating 
the New Economic Policy (NEP). The goal of the NEP was to alter the 
economic conditions for the Malay majority and to bring the mostly rural 
Malays into the country's economic mainstream (Chin 2000: 1041–45). The 
affirmative action policies initiated to that end, however, created a rentier 
class that made fortunes through government-provided monopolies and 
legal preferences. These benefits turned rentiers into a Malay upper class of 
the well connected, known as UMNO cronies.  
Malaysia's various responses to globalisation are closely associated 
with the interests of this elite group. To distribute wealth from Chinese to 
Malays, it was necessary to access foreign capital for Malaysia's economic 
modernisation. Had the available Chinese capital been mobilised, the 
Chinese could have maintained their dominant role even in the new Malay-
led country. Thus, the Malay elites found it in their interest to open the 
financial markets to foreign portfolio investment (indirect investment, rather 
than direct investment in tangible factories). It needs to be stressed that this 
rapid opening of financial markets with few institutional controls was not 
caused by the power of the U.S. Treasury Department, the IMF or 
transnational corporations, but by considerations over political power within 
the Malay political elite.  
Regardless of the reasons for the opening, this rapid and uncontrolled 
opening caused price bubbles and speculation together with capital 
misallocation (Jomo 2004: 32). The financial crisis of 1997 in Malaysia, 
which Prime Minister Mahathir blamed flatly on the forces of globalisation 
(Makaruddin 2002), is largely a consequence of this rapid and uncontrolled 
opening of financial markets. Where bubbles are allowed to emerge, they 
will eventually burst. Yet the hegemon in Malaysia's decision to join 
globalisation and on what terms was domestic. It was a coalition of political 
and economic domestic interests groups, the cronies whose fortunes were 
made through their collusion with the government under the NEP. 
After the Asian financial crisis struck Malaysia in the summer of 
1997, UMNO's grip on power depended on its ability to continue to 
distribute resources to its cronies in particular and the Malay ethnic group in 
                                                 
8 According to the U.S. State Department's Country Profile dated September 2007. The other 
ethnic groups are Indigenous 11% and Indian 7%, non-citizens 6% and others 1%. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm (accessed October 3, 2007).  
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general. Massive capital outflows threatened this redistributive capacity of 
the state. In this climate, an open row broke out between Prime Minister 
Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim, 
his political rival within the Malay political arena. Both had supported fiscal 
discipline and pro-market policies in the aftermath of the crisis. But in April 
of 1998, Anwar challenged Mahathir's leadership in UMNO when his 
supporters denounced cronyism at the UMNO national assembly. On           
May 21, 1998, Indonesia's President Suharto was toppled after he had lost 
his ability to continue to provide sufficient financial gains to his win-
coalition. The message was not lost on Mahathir. In July of 1998, a full year 
after the crisis broke out and Malaysia's economy was already recovering, 
he implemented an economic stimulus package, the first deviation from IMF 
prescriptions and also from Anwar's policies. And in September, Anwar was 
arrested and charged with sodomy. The very day of his arrest, Malaysia 
introduced capital controls, the antithesis to the preferences of the free-
market. Anwar had been highly respected in financial institutions around the 
world for his calm and pro-market approach in the aftermath of the crisis, 
the counterforce to Mahathir's fiery condemnations of the West, the IMF, 
currency speculators and the global Jewish conspiracy. With Anwar gone, 
Malaysia risked a renewed outflow of international capital, due to the fears 
that the calming force in the government had been eliminated. Thus, the 
controls were designed not to counteract the financial crisis, which had 
largely blown over by the fall of 1998, but to avoid a second meltdown in 
the wake of the finance minister's arrest. The state had shown that where its 
interest lies in opposition to globalisation's, the state has all the autonomy it 
needs to act. Mahathir used the rhetoric of neo-colonialism from abroad and 
traitors from within to gain support for his capital controls while at the same 
time ridding himself of a political challenger (Chin 2000: 1054).  
Domestic interests trumped the demands of the global economy. 
Malaysia's path through the crisis was determined, as Tourres points out, by 
Mahathir's personality more than anything else. He was determined to avoid 
relinquishing control, sovereignty and independence (Tourres 2003: 71). 
Hence he followed IMF advice for over a year, but without accepting IMF 
money, which would have been tied to binding conditionality.9 In 1998, he 
learned the lessons from Indonesia, where the fall of the rupiah and the 
evaporating treasury reserves no longer allowed President Suharto to 
maintain his system of political cronyism, which led to the Indonesian 
                                                 
9 Malaysia was in a position of rejecting IMF loans because its debt was largely domestic, unlike 
in the other crisis countries. Moreover, the influx of hard currency from natural gas and palm 
oil helped the government maintain liquidity. 
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regime's downfall. Mahathir rapidly determined that he needed to be in tight 
control of his economy and money, to assure that the groups crucial to his 
government's survival continue to see their advantage in political continuity. 
The hegemon, in the case of Malaysia, was in fact a very narrow interest 
group of the leaders of UMNO supporting Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad.  
Similarly in 2007, Malaysia failed to come to an agreement with the 
United States on a bilateral trade agreement, presumably because provisions 
in the agreement would have required open and equal bidding procedures 
for all government contracts, thus challenging the institutionalised 
preferences for Malays over other ethnic groups. Key industries in Malaysia 
supported the agreement, yet again, regime interests prevailed over the logic 
of globalisation.  
 
 
THE STATE AS ACTIVE GLOBALISER 
 
The evidence in this paper indicates that in contrast to the withering state 
theory, the state is an active participant in globalisation. Consistent with this 
view, Weiss argues that beginning with the developmental states, the state 
has actively assisted its industries to integrate into the global economy. The 
state provides incentives for investment, promotes technology alliances and 
encourages regional relocation of production networks. State capacity thus 
becomes a condition for successful internationalisation (Weiss 1997: 20–
21). This is why industrialised economies attract the lion's share of FDI, in 
spite of their high labour costs and significant regulatory burden;  this is also 
why the most globalised countries do not exhibit a race to the bottom, as the 
Kearney report (Table 1) clearly indicates.  
 The two case studies support this assumption. In Vietnam, the state 
plays a significant role in human capital creation and infrastructure 
provision, in support of promoting inward investment. This is often done by 
provincial cadres who see their own fortunes improve as international 
investment flows into their provinces, employs their residents, pays taxes to 
allow them to pay better social wages (keeping their residents willing to 
accept single-party rule) and ultimately allows for a limited, albeit still 
lucrative amount of rent seeking. In Malaysia, it was the state that, based on 
elite group demands, opened its financial markets to portfolio money 
inflows. It was also the state that reacted to the financial crisis of 1997 by 
first following market orthodoxy, then rejecting it for domestic power 
considerations. In both cases, domestic elites were the ultimate beneficiaries 
of pro-market as well as anti-market decisions. The state should therefore be 
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seen as a facilitator or perpetrator of globalisation rather than a victim 
(Weiss 1997: 20).  
 None of this means that globalisation has no limiting effect on states. 
Like every choice, the decision to join the global economy opens some 
doors, and closes others. Few small countries can gain access to the latest 
technologies and cheap consumer products unless they accept to participate 
in the global economy. Small markets do not allow for the local production 
of capital-intensive goods. Producing automobiles for a market of the size of 
Malaysia (25 million inhabitants) is not profitable, as the case of Malaysia's 
Proton vehicle painfully demonstrates. The attraction of globalisation lies in 
the access to products and financial tools that would be unavailable to an 
isolated, small national economy. States join in because their domestic elites 
see the benefits of foreign investment and export markets in pursuing their 
goals. At least in the East Asian context, it would appear that these benefits 
have trickled down to the population at large, as poverty rates have fallen 
and social wages increased in the successfully globalising countries in the 
region, from developmental states to today's export-led growth success 
stories. The industrialised countries have equally continued to grow their 
economies, in spite of domestic protests against job transfers to the 
developing world. 
 On the other hand, if globalisation is driven, as here argued, by the 
state's elites, it remains entirely possible that it does not benefit the regular 
people. A predatory state remains a possibility, but would not appear to be a 
consequence of globalisation, but of domestic institutional arrangements. 
After all, states have been predatory long before globalisation. But if we 
recall Wolf's assertion that under conditions of globalisation the state is 
either impotent to protect its citizens from the vagaries of global capitalism 
or is rendered too weak to fleece its own population (Wolf 2001: 178), the 
picture becomes more hopeful. If the state remains strong enough to 
maintain its autonomy, as Vietnam, Malaysia and the entire developed 
world demonstrate, then the problem of an inability to protect citizens is not 
of concern—the question turns to one of the state's willingness to use its 
autonomy to serve and protect its subordinate groups. At worst, the state can 
continue to fleece its own people, as it always could in the past. At best, it is 
limited in that power of predation by the demands of the global economy. 
As long as it is in the interest of the elites to reduce the level of their short-
term predation in order to attract investors for long-term benefits, average 
citizens may indeed benefit from the demands of investors: that states create 
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rules of the game that maintain social peace and economic stability, and 
enforce these rules predictably.10 
 As Malaysia has shown, when the state feels it is in its interest to 
limit the power of the global market, it still can. Vietnam has done the same 
in some sectors it considers strategic and vital. Western countries engage in 
selective reversals of their free trade policies when it suits their elites.11 
Globalisation may be irresistible, but the forms of engagement are 
negotiable. States are still in the position to devise policies for framing these 
terms. If human priorities are asserted by societies from the outset, if they 
capture globalisation rather than being captured by it, there may be genuine 
benefits from globalisation (Othman & Kessler 2000: 1014–15). This is 
arguably what Vietnam did. After the catastrophic experiment with centrally 
planned autarky, the state set the goal of socio-economic development and 
then joined the global economy to achieve it.  
The crucial issue is whether the state really has an interest in 
equitable development, and whether its subjects have enough 'voice' to push 
the state to engage with globalisation on terms that benefit society overall. A 
rent-seeking, authoritarian government could still capture globalisation in a 
way that is not in the interest of the majority. The proposition that the 
engagement with globalisation can be captured by interest groups asserts the 
primacy of the political over the universalising processes of globalisation. 
This assumption prevails in this analysis. But it must be pointed out that 
domestic institutions are historically determined. A key determinant for the 
success of the developmental state was that the state used its power not 
primarily to engage in predation, but to develop and grow the economy. The 
elites made the choice to aim for long-term power through the legitimacy 
that comes with improvements of living conditions for all. In other 
countries, elites have made a different bargain. Numerous dictators who 
have moved vast amounts of money to Swiss bank accounts used brute force 
to hold on to power as long as they could and then fled to a life in exile–and 
luxury. Why many Asians have made one choice and many African, Central 
American and Caribbean rulers the other must be the subject of another 
analysis. Suffice it to say that initial conditions likely have a role to play. 
Where a country is made up of competing and hostile groups, the state, if 
composed primarily of members of one group, will have few scruples to 
grab what it can. In homogeneous countries, the impulse to steal and run is 
                                                 
10 For a discussion on how FDI limits elites' predatory powers and devolves power downwards 
from central to provincial elites and further from provincial elites to ordinary citizens in the 
case of Vietnam, see Jandl. 
11 US tariffs on steel and catfish or European limits on shoe imports are among the recent 
examples. 
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socially less acceptable, even within the elite group. Low initial income 
inequality may play a role as well. When the poor and the rich live next to 
each other, the incentive to push for redistributive policies is great. Where 
most are equally poor, redistribution is a less attractive option than growing 
the pie for all. Due to the devastating impact of World War II on elites in 
Japan and Korea and the communist revolution's equalizing effects on 
Vietnam and China, these countries had more incentive to engage in pro-
growth policies than in large-scale redistribution (Easterly 2002: 265).  
Malaysia's consociational system posed a different set of challenges, 
and clearly not all groups have benefited from the economic growth of the 
country equally. Redistribution has taken place under the NEP. But the 
initial bargain under Merdeka, independence, that allowed the Chinese to 
retain significant economic powers in return for granting the Malays 
political supremacy may have been crucial to keeping both parties on board 
on the key principles of national unity and ethnic peace. Both sides may 
have felt that their success depended on the respective other. Malays knew 
they needed a strong, even if Chinese-dominated economy to make the NEP 
succeed. The Chinese wanted to avoid race riots at every economic 
downturn and thus took the Merdeka bargain as an acceptable compromise. 
Both dominant groups were reasonably assured that what they got under 
Merdeka was the best they could hope for, and at the same time provided 
sufficient benefits to them to be worth the compromises. The Indian 
population, small in numbers and economically marginal, had no bargaining 
power and lost out. 
The determination whether states engage in rapacious predation or 
pro-growth policies is made domestically, but participating in international 
arrangements to attract FDI has a tendency to limit the state in the area of 
oppression more than in the area of protection of its citizens.12 The crucial 
issue is not a power shift between state and non-state actors, such as 
international organisations or transnational corporations, but a sort of 
"entwinement" (Weiss 2005: 346). In the modern era, state and corporations 
have grown in power. The latter look to the state to assure adequate 
conditions for investment. The former has retained the capacity of 
regulating business to match the demands of the citizenry in terms of access 
to jobs, consumer goods and social wages. Thus, the degree to which the 
state's elites are willing to offer political voice to citizens is a research 
question that should focus more on the domestic political realm than on the 
forces of globalisation. 
                                                 
12 The exception is a situation where easily monopolisable resources are the mainstay of the 
economy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have laid out the withering state theory that informs much 
of the anti-globalisation argument. Globalisation critics have argued that 
global economic processes represent a structural constraint that small states 
cannot hope to escape. As a result, small states have two options: either stay 
outside the global economy and face the consequences of isolation—lack of 
economies of scale and scope and the poverty that comes with economic 
and technological marginalisation; or integrate into the world economy and 
accept its rules and limitations, but at the price of forsaking state autonomy. 
Doubts about this view have been voiced when empirical evidence from 
around the world did not conform to some of this theory's predictions. 
 Here, we showed that the state is not withering in two case studies of 
highly globalised—that is, economically integrated—states. These two cases 
add evidence to the arguments of those who doubt the withering state 
theory. But more importantly, the two cases add a theoretical angle to the 
debate. By bringing in assumptions why states behave the way they do, we 
expand the discussion from one of empirics to one of causality. So far, 
proponents of the withering state and convergence theories have provided us 
with assumptions about the phenomenon of globalisation as a structural 
force imposing itself on states. We remove the state from this realist 
framework in which all states are assumed to be forced to act in a manner 
predetermined by the unalterable structures of the international system and 
look at domestic processes, the capture and re-capture of the state by its 
elites. The state turns from a subject acted upon into a process, with elite 
groups and their utility-maximising interests as the causal factors for 
decisions made in contesting the position in the global economy. The two 
cases, Vietnam and Malaysia, have acted and reacted differently to global 
economic stimuli as a consequence of their different domestic arrangements. 
The elites, based on historical and demographic factors and resource 
endowment, have positioned themselves differently in their attempt to 
maintain power and wealth. This positioning determines the policy 
decisions they take during the state's engagement with the global economy. 
 This approach allows the observer to investigate more fundamental 
processes than global structures or state reactions. We can ask, what 
arrangements have the elites that capture the state made to assure their 
power? With this understanding, we can then evaluate policies in the 
context of elite interest. When high inflation caught up with Vietnam in 
early 2008, for example, it was predictable that the Vietnamese elite would 
try to bring inflation under control even at the expense of immediate elite 
interest (such as deflating real estate prices and stock market value), since 
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the Communist Party—Vietnam's ruling elite—has made the determination 
that its fortunes are inextricably linked with the ability to provide continued 
economic improvements for all strata of society. Withering state theory 
would have predicted the opposite outcome, focusing on the power of 
investors in FDI-dependent Vietnam. Empirical analysis of earlier data 
alone would have provided little, since the rapid emergence of high levels of 
inflation is a first in Vietnam's period of global integration. Linking what we 
know about global economic forces to domestic institutional arrangement 
provides us with a fuller picture of causal factors about decision-making 
under changing economic conditions.  
 In contrast to Vietnam, Malaysia the ruling elite is less growth and 
more distribution-oriented. As a consequence, it focuses on keeping crucial 
segments of society content rather than society on the whole. A view on 
global processes or analysis of existing data alone would not have yielded 
these insights; instead, an understanding of Malaysia's domestic processes 
as determinant factors for its decisions on how to engage with the global 
system yields richer results.  
 If globalisation is inevitable, it is not because of the dominant 
discourse of corporations or what is generically called 'the West,' but 
because of the groundswell of demands from large numbers of regular 
people. The elites saw it in their interest to join the global economy, in order 
to maintain their power and benefit economically. They could only do so by 
satisfying a bottom-up demand for economic improvement. But where elites 
have managed to limit what Weiss (see above) called the "logic of voice" to 
a smaller segment of society, reaction to crisis will be different than in a 
society where 'voice' is broader. 
 No case study can claim universal generalisability, but the insights 
into the examples of Vietnam and Malaysia allow us to ask better questions 
for more research. Both Malaysia and Vietnam are strong states and 
internationally well integrated economies. Further studies should look at 
countries with weak state capacity and countries that have remained at the 
margins of the global economy. The suggestion emerging from this paper is 
that weak states attract less FDI than stronger ones, and that less globalised 
states would exhibit lower social wage levels than more integrated ones. 
Cases could be studied in countries where due to the fractured nature of the 
state because of unresolved elite capture and constant infighting, state 
capacity is extremely low. Atzili argued that such states end up as 
international trouble makers, since their internal instability spills over into 
regional conflicts (Atzili 2007). These countries, because they never even 
temporarily resolve the conflict among elites for control over the state, 
cannot provide the conditions for international investors to take the risk and 
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commit resources (except in natural resource extraction, where the limited 
availability of the resource is a natural limitation on investors' location 
decisions). As a consequence, the elites continue to engage in battles over 
distribution rather than growing the pie. The result is a very broad pyramid 
of wealth distribution, with a broad base of widespread poverty and an 
extremely small top, with little in between. Cases include sub-Saharan 
Africa, where it appears that the weak states are indeed attracting very little 
FDI. Central and South America contain fractured states. Eastern European 
states such as Ukraine or Georgia fall into this category. Studying these and 
similar cases would provide a test for the hypothesis that trade integration 
does not lead to a withering state, but on the contrary, that the withering of 
the state (or its failure to consolidate in the first place) does not allow for 
successful international integration. These would be welcome tests for the 
central tenet of this paper, that significant state capacity is a precondition for 
integration and continued participation in the global economy. 
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